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§ 62A-12-209(1) (Supp. 1992) 
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§ 62A-12-240 (Supp. 1992) 
§ 62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992) 
§ 76-2-305(4) (1990) 
§ 77-16-5 (1990) (enacted 1980) 
§ 77-16a-5 (effective March 13, 1990) 
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§ 77-38-2(6) (effective March 13, 1990) 
§§ 62A-12-241, 77-16-5, and 77-16a-5 are attached as Addendum D 
here. 
CORRECTION OF ERRATA 
The State asserts that Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-16-1 and -5 
were repealed in 1992. State's Brief at 6. This statute has never 
been repealed.1 
The correct citation for In re Estate of Bartell. cited 
in State's Brief at 4, is 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1985). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although the State sets forth a bifurcated standard of 
review (no deference to PSRB, but deference to trial court findings 
based on live testimony) , it fails to specify any fact findings 
which were based on testimony at the evidentiary hearing. 
In its brief, the only evidence from the evidentiary 
hearing cited by the State concerns the testimony of Mr. Verville 
about the clinical standards used for transfer of people from the 
hospital to the prison. State's Brief at 15-17. Mr. Dall is not 
challenging Mr. Verville's opinions on this matter. Whether his 
opinion is legally correct is a question of law accorded no 
deference. Thus, for all practical purposes this Court's review is 
entirely non-deferential. 
Petitioner accurately noted that § 77-16-5 is still in effect 
in his prehearing memorandum at p. 10 n.9 (R. 288-323 at 297 n.9), 
and again in his trial brief at 30 n.10 (R. 375-461 at 411 n.10). 
The trial court erroneously indicated that this section was 
repealed in 1990 in its signed minute entry decision at p. 3 (R. 
492-500 at 494). In his post judgment motion at p. 8 %2 (R. 503-
511 at 510 %2) , petitioner again pointed out that § 77-16-5 has 
never been repealed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I . BURGESS DOES NOT DISPOSE OF ANY UP 
MR. PALL'S CLAIMS. 
(Respondiny L U a u * - • - ' • : * • - }# 
State v. Burgess, ~.
 H Hiile 
tangential.'. relevanf t.o the instarr r^oceedings, _- not 
determi~ v 
. _gess plea M^^J.-. y a^a mciiLdii " 1"! *:~ three counts 
of sexual abuse of ^ "hi Id. Id. ar 2T Burnes^ '"h i <* ^^jrt 
(enacteu .^*.\ * S L J J I .n effect/ : * .= b ipp. 
1990) {enacted Mar-'i 1990 > -i 1 P H --, . -*** -7^rornPn ^he 
. .- ^ict^. concerns whether £ "•' l*- ^ -enacted I960; st.i, 
effect : H^ L< 'enacted M^r^i ' i* % ?pealed uu., , 
: ', tt ap amei.ueu) 
controls h±s review commitment anil possjDie transfer the 
prison. The- "Question presented here was not presented in Burgess .2 
puiLjcbb ,.r . • ;ation , t ' -16a - 2 03 
was not retroactive, a- the placement dispute '; \ ,i r^r occur until 
t_h^ end ^f " -»- V H F F* a^u^^r ;t question were mere] y procedi n a] , 
< - - i: ight s; and, :i n ai ly e v ent, 
2Mr. Ball falls . ,, A* I. terms of § 7 7 16 -5, as he 
pled guilty and ment^-u.^ J.^ .1 to fo. ^J_C sexual abuse, an offense 
specifically enumerated in § 77-16-1. While a possible argument 
could be made that §§ 77-16-1 et seq. should also apply to the 
offense of sexual abuse of a child, no such claim was presented to 
the Burgess court, and the opinion fails to address the issue. Any 
claim concerning § G2A-12-241 •„-. " kewise not raised or addressed 
in Burgess. 
3 
Mr. Burgess was not prejudiced because the later statute is more 
beneficial to him. 870 P. 2d at 280 and n.6. In contrast, Mr. Dall 
claims ex post facto application because both § 77-16-5 and § 62A-
12-241 are more beneficial to him, and he has been prejudiced. 
The State erroneously asserts that "[s] tatutory language 
when Dall committed his crime contained no guidance to steer either 
the hospital's discretion in discharging him or the Board's 
discretion in committing him to prison." State's Brief at 15, see 
also id. at 17 ("pre-1990 transfer provision (which contained no 
standards)"). Counsel for the State inexplicably ignores § 77-16-5 
and § 62A-12-241, despite extensive discussion of these statutes in 
Mr. Dall's Opening Brief at 30-33. 
The State's assertion that a guilty and mentally ill plea 
does not invoke § 77-16-5, State's Brief at 17-18 n.6, demonstrates 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the guilty and mentally ill 
statutory scheme by the State. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-l(3) 
("The defendant shall be advised that a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill is a plea of guilty . . .") (repealed July 1, 1992); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-16a-103 (3) (a) (same) (effective July 1, 1992). The 
guilty and mentally ill scheme focuses on the defendant's mental 
state at sentencing, and triggers an automatic assessment of the 
defendant's mental state. For all other purposes, a guilty and 
mentally ill plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. 
State v. Young, 853 P. 2d 327, 384-5 (Utah 1993) (opinion of Durham, 
Zimmerman, and Stewart, JJ.). In fact, defendants are free to 
4 
raise mental illness .,s late as * sentencii.a heai " ^ 
Murphy S'7" T' n~ ou, ^o^o vUtaii * l •' 
' « cnnltv and mei . 3 serves to bring 
him wl'hir*. 3 •ri- ^ i r ; i - r § 7'" . t- L and -'J . The nrial cou: t so held, 
U / L J
 ( in shOU±U L. Hi 
!, f/liii 1,2
 t. J 1 a n d : ^ w l s e *.r A.i.. . .. . ,*.,. *K.-^J_ , v_cti. . t n i t F S I M -
failed onsider whether *'- sufficient:^ recovered, 
instead *- i i*»< - • • 
standard. The PSRB likewise failed to address whether 
incarceration at t:he State Hospital was aauravatmu Mi 
condil i on , hH" ho i 
specified WIILLI- eatmej^ ,'L«i,, o*^  requi 
241(2) (a) . Because ti - State rh d not ^hnv * • v- ,-n m ^ t ^ rb~ 
requireme 
transferred. 
Final "I v thp Si- ^  *~ P r* i t & * Smith y. Batchelor, 11 « - P, 2 d 
. . s 
claims that <,*--** s oresumaL ^A 12-24 I.) govern 
transfer. State's Pr<ef < •-* Batchelor, the nurreme 
>pi ?• . L\ - __ :t. j in 
•vd.ver of tnat iss:^ e- tiere , - t nap M,. * briefed his claims 
on appeal, and they are not waived pursuant to Batchelor. 
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POINT II. MR. DALL HAS FULLY MARSHALLED THE 
EVIDENCE. 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point II, pp. 18-9) 
The State relies on a blanket marshalling argument to 
dismiss Mr. Dall's sufficiency of the evidence claim. 
Significantly, the State fails to give a single example of any 
scrap of evidence that Mr. Dall has failed to marshal.3 The 
evidence here is fully marshalled, and Mr. Dall's claim should be 
addressed on the merits. 
Mr. Dall properly cited the marshalling requirement, 
Opening Brief at 3, and complied with its mandate. It is 
undisputed that the State called no witnesses at the June 28, 1991 
PSRB hearing, as correctly found by the trial court. R. 569 
(Findings %9) . There is thus no evidence presented by the State to 
be marshalled. 
Looking at the evidence presented by Mr. Dall's witness, 
Dr. Philip Washburn, the only evidence supporting the State's 
position is testimony concerning the "plateau" that had been 
reached in Mr. Dall's treatment. Mr. Dall marshalled this evidence 
presented by this (the only) witness. See Opening Brief at 18-25. 
Mr. Dall discussed Dr. Washburn's discussion of how Mr. Dall had 
reached a plateau in his treatment, and has demonstrated on appeal 
that the PSRB's finding of maximum benefit is so lacking in support 
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 
3The reason is simple: there is no unmarshalled evidence. 
6 
Mi Da] 1 cli d 1 i . :•' :.--• ' to get the trial court to state 
what evide^^ rr:r~~rt^d ' iic PSRB's determination. Although not 
r eg U l^ ^ ^ judgment motions requesting, inter alia, 
as follows: 
Petitioner feels that specific f :i nd :i ngs 01 1 the 
following points are necessary, 
] , What evidence in the record created before 
the PSRB supports the PSRB's determination that Mr. Dall 
had received "maximum benefit."2 Petitioner is unaware 
of any evidence that supports this determination. 
* " Petitioner's Brief at Point II, pp. 34 c 
,_ ,.^„- he evidence adduced at the PSRB hear: 
utterly t. to support a finding of maximum benef: 
See also id. at 18-26, summarizing the testimony at • 
PSRB hearing and indicating that there was no testiir y 
that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit. 
L Hiding & r- >,. unuLe enti\ proposed 
findings k S46 ^l-4 ^n( 1 , . . • •liM*-*.} - ••^quest - »^ i- *-h<5 r^ -^ rt 
n 
c;i • jurtixv>: . >3 . A copy ot M) J M . p r o p o s e d f i n d i n g s 
i s a t t a c h e d a? Arid-r ^ 
M<- il In'i i In »l dt c inn i In i i. i MI 1 mi! i iiuii,'. ueeri of any 
a s s i s t a n c e in p o i n t i n g out any e v i d e n c e t h a t s u p p o r t s t h e PSRB's 
f i n d i n g s . Mr. Dal] h a s d i s c u s s e d t h e ->*'- -^ -^  i n n c e t h a t can 
]
 ; ;. h a f . _„ . n g , 
namely t h e " p l a t e a u " t e s t i m o n y of Dr. Washbur:-. ^n-: .^iiow; ; t o be 
i n s u f f i c i e n t ^->rv >f *-h\c «wiH«r,<-^-. ,,. •* » -iched a s Addendum B 
- n a t i o n . 
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POINT III. THE STATE'S PROPOSED DEFINITION OF 
"MAXIMUM BENEFIT" IS UNSUPPORTED BY ANY 
PRECEDENT, AND IS MERELY A POST HOC 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE PSRB'S ACTION. 
(Responding to the State's Brief at Point III, pp. 
20-22) 
The State asserts, without any citation to the record, 
that lf[t]he evidence at the PSRB hearing, repeated at the trial 
court, was that Dall had received all the help from the state 
hospital that he could receive from the hospital and that the state 
prison could provide him the same treatment." State's Brief at 21. 
This is a mischaracterization of the evidence. In its fact 
statement, the State cites PSRB at 41 for this proposition. The 
State's discussion of the evidence at the PSRB hearing in total is 
as follows: 
Dr. Washburn testified that Dall had reached a 
plateau and his condition had stabilized to the point 
that he no longer required the services of the hospital. 
(Id. at 41). However, Dr. Washburn made it clear that 
Dall would continue to need treatment, although the 
treatment would be of a stabilizing, rather than a 
curative, nature. Indeed, Dr. Washburn stated that were 
it not for Dall's criminal sentence, the hospital 
probably would have already discharged him from the 
hospital to another setting. (Jd. at 50) . 
State's Brief at 9.4 
A review of this testimony is underwhelming. Dr. 
Washburn's testimony was that Mr. Dall had been stabilized, but 
that he had not received maximum benefit. PSRB at 39-45 (Addendum 
B). The hospital was recommending transfer for economic reasons, 
4Pages 41 and 50 are both cited and discussed in Mr. Dall's 
Opening Brief. See id. at 24. The State's marshalling argument is 
a baseless attempt to avoid the merits. 
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despite Mr. Dall's not having received maximum benefit. PSRB at 
21-22, 49-51 (Addendum C). 
Now, for the very first time, the State has proposed its 
definition of maximum benefit: 
(1) the patient has received medication and other forms 
of treatment at the hospital and his mental functioning 
has improved; (2) the patient's condition has remained 
stable for a reasonable time; and [sic] (3) the state 
hospital has no additional medications or therapeutic 
forms of treatment that will further improve the 
patient's mental condition; and (4) another institution, 
such as the prison, can provide treatment suitable to 
maintain the patient's current condition. 
State's Brief at 21. This self serving description of the 
treatment afforded Mr. Dall is wholly unrelated to the statutory 
standard of maximum benefit codified in § 77-16a-5 (now § 77-16a-
203 (3) (a)). While perhaps the statutes should speak in terms of 
stabilization rather than maximum benefit, see PSRB at 23-4, 34-5, 
they do not. The plain language of the statute does not permit 
"maximum benefit" to be stretched to the lengths suggested by the 
State. 
POINT IV. MR. PALL'S EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 ARGUMENTS ARE RIPE 
AND MERITORIOUS. 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point IV, pp. 22-
24) 
Contrary to the State's assertion that Mr. "Dall has 
never been at the prison," State's Brief at 22, Mr. Dall is 
currently at the prison, and has been there since this Court denied 
his motion for stay by order dated January 14, 1994. 
9 
Counsel has visited Mr. Ball at the prison (May 4, 1994) , 
spoken to him on the phone, and received correspondence from him. 
Mr. Ball reports that he is housed in the general prison 
population, and is currently receiving no mental health treatment 
at all. His requests to see Br. Van Austin have been denied, 
citing the State Hospital's determination that Mr. Ball is no 
longer mentally ill. Correspondence received from Mr. Ball 
suggests that he is far from being mentally healthy. 
Regardless of whether it would be cruel or unusual or 
constitute unnecessary rigor to house Mr. Ball at the prison while 
keeping him on proper medication, the State has failed to achieve 
even this. Mr. Ball is not receiving any treatment at all, see 
also R. 565 (letter to Judge Lewis) , despite his need for such 
treatment. Bespite the prison's apparent ability to provide mental 
health treatment to Mr. Ball, as a result of administrative 
convenience, whim, or caprice the prison is refusing to provide any 
treatment to him. 
In light of the present circumstances, if this Court 
declines to reverse on a different basis it would be appropriate to 
remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing concerning 
Mr. Ball's current condition and lack of necessary treatment at the 
prison. 
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POINT V. NO JUDICIAL OFFICER HAS EVER 
DETERMINED THAT MR. PALL SHOULD BE SENT 
TO PRISON. 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point V, pp. 24-26) 
The State glosses over the fact that Judge Hanson never 
determined that Mr. Dall should go to prison. To the contrary, he 
specifically found that prison would not be appropriate. Sent, at 
63-70. Rather than being a mere "administrative placement 
process," the determination that an offender should go to prison is 
a core judicial function that to date has not been performed in Mr. 
Dall's case. 
POINT VI. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS ARE NOT THE 
TYPE OF REVIEW CONTEMPLATED BY THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE. 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point VI, pp. 26-
27) 
Extraordinary writs are fundamentally different than the 
type of judicial review contemplated by the separation of powers 
doctrine. " [T]he writ can neither substitute for, nor perform the 
function of, regular appellate review." Parsons v. Barnes. 871 
P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994) (citing Codianna v. Morris. 660 P.2d 
1101, 1104 (Utah 1983)) . The writ of habeas corpus has always been 
available. See U.S. Const, art. I, section 9, clause 2; Utah 
Const, art I, section 5. The separation of powers doctrine 
requires direct appellate review when the executive branch 
exercises judicial functions. Allowing writs to substitute for 
direct review writes the separation of powers doctrine out of 
existence. 
11 
The PSRB exercised a judicial function. Mr. Dall's 
appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. An unconstitutional 
delegation of judicial power has occurred. The order of the PSRB 
must be vacated. 
POINT VII. THE PSRB HEARING WAS A CRITICAL STAGE 
OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MR. DALL. 
(Responding to State's Brief at Point VII, pp. 27-
28) 
Because the PSRB was performing a sentencing function, 
and made the first and only determination that Mr. Dall should go 
to prison, the PSRB hearing was a critical stage in the proceedings 
against Mr. Dall. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and his Opening Brief, Mr. Dall 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order of the PSRB 
transferring him to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this C&L day of September, 1994. 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have caused 
four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be delivered to 
James H. Beadles, Attorney General's Office, 330 South 300 East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this £±t day of September, 1994. 
K. "Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of September, 1994. 
DrsKnv 
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ADDENDUM A 
Petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R. 546-554) 
MARK R. MOFFAT (5112) 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN (5481) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
Attorneys for Petitioner Kirk W. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KIRK W. DALL, : PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH, THE UTAH STATE : 
BOARD OF PARDONS, and THE UTAH Case No. 910902993-HC 
STATE PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY : 
REVIEW BOARD, The Honorable LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Respondents. 
Petitioner KIRK W. DALL, through his attorneys Mark R. 
Moffat and Robert K. Heineman, respectfully submits his proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. These findings are 
drafted in accordance with the Court's minute entry dated August 
13, 1993, and are intended to accurately reflect the Court's 
actual ruling. Petitioner intimates no opinion as to the 
correctness of any of these findings and conclusions, and 
reserves all issues for appeal. Findings and conclusions not 
actually included in the Court's minute entry or enclosed in 
brackets. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner's request for extraordinary relief was 
originally filed May 10, 1991, and was subsequently amended. 
^ s\ r- A /> 
J 
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Dall 
2. Petitioner seeks relief under Rule[s] 65B [(b), 
(c), and ] (e). Petitioner challenges the finding of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board ("PSRB") that Mr. Dall has 
received "maximum benefit from treatment" and should be 
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. 
3. On May 9, 1989, Mr. Dall entered a plea of guilty 
and mentally ill to one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse and one 
count of kidnapping, both second degree felonies. Judge Timothy 
R. Hanson ordered that Mr. Dall be transported to the Utah State 
Hospital for diagnostic evaluation. 
4. On August 10, 1989 Judge Hanson issued on order 
transferring Mr. Dall to the jurisdiction of the PSRB. 
[ 5. The PSRB held a hearing on April 19, 1991, and 
entered its order dated April 24, 1991, finding that Mr. Dall had 
received maximum benefit, and should be transferred to the 
jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. 3 
6. Petitioner filed his petition on May 10, 1991. An 
appeal to the Court of Appeals was also filed. A stay was 
obtained from Judge Scott Daniels. Upon Judge Daniels' 
retirement, Judge Iwasaki was assigned. He recused himself, and 
this Court was appointed. 
[ 7. Due to a problem with the recording equipment 
used, no record was made of the April hearing. ] 
8. An additional hearing was held on July 28, 1991 
J/ and has been transcribed. 
[ 9. The State called no witnesses at the June 28 
hearing. Dr. Philip Washburn was called and examined by counsel 
for Mr. Dall, and cross-examined by the State. Dr. Washburn 
testified that Mr. Dall had NOT received maximum benefit from 
treatment, and that Mr. Dall must receive treatment for the rest 
of his life. Dr. Washburn testified that Mr. Dall had reached a 
plateau in his treatment and was not progressing as rapidly as 
the hospital would like, but that Mr. Dall would still benefit 
from further treatment at the hospital. ] 
10. On July 2, 1991 the PSRB issued a second order 
finding that Mr. Dall had received maximum benefit and should be 
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons. 
[ 11. At the time Mr. Dall was committed to the 
jurisdiction of the PSRB, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2(6) provided 
for judicial review of determinations of the PSRB. ] 
[ 12. Effective March 13, 1990, § 77-38-2(6) was amended 
to provide appeal only for persons found not guilty by reason of 
insanity. ] 
[ 13. Effective March 13, 1990, § 77-16a-5 was enacted, 
providing a maximum benefit standard for transfer from the 
hospital. (This section was repealed July 1, 1992, but the same 
standard is currently codified in § 77-16a-203(3)(a)(ii).) ] 
[ 14. Mr. Dall appealed the PSRB's decision to the Court 
of Appeals# but the appeal was dismissed for lack of 
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jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Dall had no 
right of appeal from the PSRB's decision. ] 
15. An evidentiary hearing before this Court was held 
on June 14, 1993, with closing arguments heard on August 4, 1993. 
16. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Verville testified 
on behalf of the State that the hospital did not interpret the 
maximum benefit standard as relaxing the standard for transfer of 
a person to the Board of Pardons. He-otatcd that Lhe " itiaximmn — 
/htanfarrl l " nf.anrinrfl in rommpnrnirnt,nt -in arpl X^ntio^r^^trri fh° " 
V \J 'clinical criteiia lui Lite "sufficiently recoveredir""stctndard,-
uliniual Learn recomm^hd^ when a patient ha3 received:-as 
i m i r h ^ n l i n i n n l « » i ' u i i " * M w . ^ a n ng n r h P n p f i f f n t-haf- p a t i e n t a t 
-fehe^hQS£ital. 
[ 17. Mr. Verville testified that the hospital 'is and 
wag at all timco- unaware of the correct legal standard for— 
/ df t--raneg-Fg>-g^ if patHgni-g Frnm I-tin arafP-Vi^pifnl
 j nnrV^norzsty applied 
c*v_(/ x their own fclinical* standard rflgin'illnwn uf M m i ^ i .standard in 
[ 18. This Court issued its minute entry decision on 
August 13, 1993. ] 
[ 19. Petitioner filed post judgment motions pursuant to 
Rules 52(a), 59(e), and 62(b) and (d) on August 19, 1992. In 
this Court's absence, am ex parte stay order was signed by 
Presiding Judge Michael R. Murphy, pending further order of this 
Court. ] 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner's request for relief is denied. 
[ 2. This action is properly analyzed under Rule 65B(e) 
("where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion"). To the extent petitioner relies on Rule 
65B(b) (wrongful imprisonment) and Rule 65B(c) (other wrongful 
restraints on personal liberty), such claims are found to be 
inappropriate and are dismissed with prejudice. ] 
3. OTsah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 [ /(enacted 1980, still 
in effect1) ] provides, "A person committed to the state 
hospital after sentence\who has sufficiently recovered from his 
mental disease or defect dijall be certified to the Board of 
Pardons. 
[ 4. "Sufficiently ^ trecdyered from his mental disease or 
defect" means 
5 . "Maximum bene f i t from treatment%means 
^hn Cmirr'n min"1"* Hnm'm'*n in,-.. ••• i i
 v stated tjhnr rhT> 
<r-gta€uta was rgpnft1«'* in ^ ^ — f - t io in ki £&&c s t tiIT"~lu ed 
nn^^n 
6. There is no substantive difference, at least in 
their application, between the phrases "maximum benefit" and y 
"StegflCifellLiy recevereaT^—no codified in^the statute 
[ 7. The state hospital's transfer policies and 
procedures for transfer under the "sufficiently recovmed" AA^ ^i 
standard were not arbitrary and capricious, and were in yi^7's2A 
conformity with the requiremonto of ETVy-lfe-S-r- - ] 
[ 8- Because transfer under the " suIIiiieiiLly" 
j ^ ^ p ^ r ^ r - p f } " pfran^ajsr l and H i f t " m n v ^ n m h n n f t f - i t - " r f n n H n r H i n fptv xl 1 
(Z^yi <&T JCU, +y~^ &b '**' />$&/5 JU^^^SJ JW-VC fan *^£ *** 
ifitTEnlCb and purposes identical, application of the "maximum 
benefit" standard to Mr. Ball does not make imposition of Mr. 
Ball's punishment more burdensome, and thus does not violate the 
ex post facto clauses of the federal or Utah constitutions. ] 
9. The conditions at the Utah State Prison do not 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The mental health unit 
at the Utah State Prison is capable of meeting Mr. Ball's medical 
and mental health needs, as they presently exist. 
[ 10. frho Ut-erir-gt^ fee Prison ^^ 
capable of meeting Mr. Ball's safety needs, and protecting Mr. 
Ball from predation and harm from other inmates. ] 
11. A review of the 30 page settlement reached between 
the parties in Henry v. Beland. Civil No. 89-C-1124J (B. Utah) 
convinces the Court that the facilities at the mental health unit 
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are [^ will be—3- neither inadequate, nor cruel and unusual* 
[ ail such time as the prison achieves lull compliance wiLh Lhe 
-"•"settlement—J-—: 
12. The treatment issues and Mr. Dall's mental 
condition, and the appropriateness of his transfer from the state 
hospital to the jurisdiction of the state's Board of Pardons, are 
all issues that are particularly within the expertise of the 
PSRB. 
13. The Board was not exercising a clearly judicial 
function when it transferred jurisdiction of Mr. Dall to the 
Board of Pardons. Judge Hanson had already carried out the 
judicially-authorized function of imposing sentence in 1989. The 
Board was merely carrying out that sentence in accordance with 
their lawful powers and authority. 
14. Where there is no statute specifically authorizing 
judicial review, review may be had by "traditional means" of 
extraordinary writ. 
15. The PSRB's action does not violate the separation 
of powers provision of the Utah Constitution. 
[ 16. The lack of an appeal right from decisions of the 
PSRB for persons other than those found not guilty by reason of 
insanity does not violate Mr. Dall's right to appeal under 
Article I, §§ 7 and 12, and Article VIII# § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. ] 
7 
0C552 
17, The ac t ions of the PSRB were n e i t h e r arb i trary , 
c a p r i c i o u s , nor unlawful. y4-—The PSRD's dec ia ion io cpipfported 
—by Lilt* lolioWliig-^^rideng^j 
z 
>T>SRB' 
x 
. ] 
18. TheT> s transfer decision was not the 
imposition of a sentence, but merely the execution of a lawfully 
imposed sentence. The hearing before the PSRB was not a critical 
stage of the proceedings entitling petitioner to compulsory 
process [ or financial access to expert testimony ] 
19. The petitioner's request that the decision of the 
PSRB be set aside is denied. 
[ 20. This Court's order $7 ^C^hlUj- ^&J W ^ . , 
^fnypi r^^rcj '^  nnim1 iMn 'T ^ " H H nir i r' iIMln ju'ljmrnl 
morions 
I 2Tz Thia Court fo ordoi 
-W-is 
4—3—±s not 
gfaygri pnnrHng a^j j i ia l -
8 
00553 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of September, 
1993. 
Mark R. Moffat 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Robert K. Heineman, hereby certify that I have 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing PROPOSED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be delivered to Lorenzo K. 
Miller and James H. Beadles, the Attorney General's Office, 330 
South, 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 2-0 day of 
September, 1993. 
Robert K./Heineman 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of September, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM B 
"Plateau" testimony of Dr. Philip Washburn at June 28, 1991 PSRB 
hearing. (PSRB at 39-45, 60) 
perhaps In a well-structured halfway house with regulating his 
medications from that setting. With a person who has his kind 
of disorder and illness, then with charges
 f we have the extra 
problem of the danger that comes from that part of his 
personality and his illness, the paraphilia. That makes it a 
management problem In terms of safety to the community and to 
him. 
Bradshaw: Let me change it a bit. Let me add to my 
hypothetical world if I can. Not only are we not dealing with 
management decisions because of overcrowding in the Hospital, 
but we are also assuming in my hypothetical that Mr. Dall is 
in a secure setting where he is not released to the community, 
where the threat to the community is not an issue. And my 
question to you would be, given that hypothetical world, 
whether or not, in your opinion, strictly as a psychiatrist, 
whether or not he has received the maximum benefit that 
treatment can provide to him? 
Washburn: Maximum hospital benefit? 
Bradshaw: Maximum benefit from treatment? 
Washburn: No. No. Again, when we talk about maximum or we 
talk about ongoing treatment, I think we have trouble in terms 
of our thinking, the maximum in a way has to be ongoing. He 
39 
must stay on the medication. It would be like a diabetic 
would needs to be on insulin, keep a diet, keep all those 
things good and stable and if they do not they can have a 
reoccurrence of their illness obviously. 
Bradshaw: Is it fair to say that this goes back to my 
questions about curing and fixing as opposed to maintaining? 
Washburn: That's part of it, right. 
Bradshaw: That the nature of your profession is such that 
when you speak of treatment it doesn't mean cure or fix it 
means... 
Washburn: Certainly not, in these kinds of illnesses. Now 
there may be some people we can cure and fix, but that have 
very limited kinds of emotional disorders that might "cured" 
in terms of the situation or the event that is occurring right 
at the time; but these kind of major mental illnesses, their 
natural history is one of continued symptoms, particularly 
under stress. It's a continually ongoing treatment, it's a 
maximum treatment. I mean continuing treatment has to be part 
of it. The question gets to be in what setting. Obviously, 
in this day and age there's getting to be more pressures to 
not have people in expensive hospital settings. So part of the 
one is economics, get this person out of the hospital as soon 
40 
as possible, get them into another setting and continue the 
treatment there. This is what we would be doing with Kirk if 
he didn't have this sentence and the other complications of 
his disorders. Ideally, my way of thinking would be that the 
people who are guilty but mentally ill ought to have a system 
different from the prison system in which we could have a 
hospital 
for the acute, more severe. A secure place for them at the 
time of needing the treatment. Secure residential programs 
where they could be transferred when the acute
 f more intense 
treatment was not needed, but where there would be security 
for both the client/patient/inmate. I don't want to call that 
name and society. But, it would be one system and the prison 
system to my way of thinking would not be the best system. 
The reality is that's the alternative we have at this point 
and we've made the recommendation. Not that Kirk can't benefit 
from someone continuing to follow him with the medication, 
making adjustments over a period of a number of months and 
years, but that he's reaching some sort of plateau and that 
our resources our limited. 
Bradshaw: And someone else can more acutely use the bed than 
Mr. Dall? 
Washburn: That's correct. 
41 
Bradshaw: But in terns, and I know you've responded to it, 
but let me just try and get you to respond again. In terms 
of whether he's received the maximum benefit, if we assume my 
hypothetical that we're not dealing with those economic 
issuesf would it be your opinion that he has not received 
maximum benefit? 
Washburn: If I had other resources he would be in the other 
resources like a well managed, well structured residential 
setting. 
Bradshaw: And you would prefer to treat him in that setting? 
Washburn: Oh yes, yea. 
Bradshaw: In your opinion as a psychiatrist, this standard of 
maximum benefit from treatmentf does it make, is that a 
difficult standard for you? Does it cause you difficulties? 
Washburn: It causes me difficulty. 
Bradshaw: Could you tell us why? 
Washburn: For the very reasons I've been trying to talk 
around and to. It has the connotation or implication that 
okay, now we're cured. It's like okay we've given all the 
42 
chemotherapy to cure that cancer we can, or we've given all 
the antibiotic we need to do. Or we've done the surgery now 
*wH the surgery's done and we've gotten them through the post-
op period and now they can go out and have received maximum 
hospital benefit. That's, I think, the place r have trouble. 
The model just doesn't quite fit my way of thinking for a 
severe and mentally-ill psychiatric patients. 
Bradshaw: You mentioned with Mr. Dall and with persons with 
similar diagnosis that there is a need for lesser treatments 
at times and more intensive treatments at times. I take it 
that's inherent with the type of illness? 
Washburn: Yes, yes. There's exacerbations depending on the 
circumstances. Maybe extra stress that can cause it. 
Sometimes the exacerbations occur and we don't even know why. 
Bradshaw: And so there are times when they can be out in the 
community or in a less-structured setting and there are times 
when they may need hospitalization? 
Washburn: That's correct. 
Bradshaw: Oo you foresee in Kirk's future that there may come 
a r^mm when he would need renewed hospitalization or 
hospitalization again? 
43 
Washburn: Well, it's possible. 
Bradshawt I think that's all I have Doctor, thank you. 
Washburn: Thank you. 
Chair: Oo you have any questions, Mr. Hunt? 
Hunt: Yes, I'd like you to just basically go through and 
give the reasoning you've given, bits and pieces, throughout 
your testimony so far; but I'd like you to tell the Board why 
you have come to the conclusion that at this point Kirk has 
received maximum benefits 
at the hospital, from his hospital stay. 
Washburn: I don't think I've ever used the word maximum. 
Hunt: Oh, okay. Why is it your recommendation at this point 
that Kirk is ready to be moved on to the Board of Pardons? If 
that's your recommendation? 
Washburn: That was our recommendation. In terms of the 
thinking, with the charge and the seriousness of the charge 
obviously, we felt he was not, that he still presents a risk 
and a danger and that he does need a secure facility. And 
that with the sentence and the charges that would seem logical 
44 
that the facility would be the prison sen-ting* They do have 
some resources. It is not a hospital/ I'm mean we're not 
saying we're transferring him from one hospital to another, 
we're saying we're transferring him from a hospital to a 
prison secure setting. But they do have some resources there 
in terms of follow-up medications. In terms of the medication 
we have spent timef we've found what I think is a good 
combination of medications that if he is followed in that 
setting, where there is someone following him, then they 
should be able to do that. He's plateauing, he's coming to a 
point to where the amount of benefit coming from what we do is 
diminishing in terms of return. 
Hunt: I see. Is it fair to say that Kirk in the past has been 
resistant to treatment? 
Washburn: Yes, that's correct. 
Hunt: Is it fair to say that in the past he has felt that he 
understands his needs better than the professionals treating 
him? 
Washburn: 7es, he's made statements quite similar to that. 
Hunt: Let me ask you a little bit more about the treatment 
that may be available at the Utah State Prison. I understand 
4S 
unit of some I guess it was almost 30 patients. Dennis could 
tell us about that. Because of these other demands we've had 
to make a choice there too. 
Chairs Would you say that Mr. Oall then, has, generally 
speaking, plateaued out as far as the benefits from hospital 
stay is concerned. 
Washburn: Yes, I think that would be maybe a fair and 
accurate way to say it. 
Chair: Okay, I believe that is all I have to question now. 
I turn the time back for should we say a brief rebuttal. 
Bradshaw: A brief, a brief, very brief. You spoke of the 
number of people who are at the prison, and I don't think you 
specifically referred to them as mentally ill offenders, but 
I assume that's what you were talking about including organic 
and mental retardation that are at the prison. 
Washburn: Organic mental retardation, people who are mentally 
ill, who may ave been mentally ill and the crime was a direct 
product of that mental illness or who have "anti-social*9 
personalities who become mentally ill and psychotic there. 
Bradshaw: These people who suffer this mental illness who are 
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ADDENDUM C 
Economic considerations testimony of Dr. Philip Washburn at June 
28, 1991 PSRB hearing. (PSRB at 21-22, 49-51) 
competent, they would be sent back for further treatment until 
they theoretically would become competent. And also those who 
were guilty and mentally ill, would be also treated here. So 
you can see that the increase in the demands on this resource 
have been significant. We have those pressures, those are 
realities. A person who is guilty and mentally ill who comes 
under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board, if we feel the person is coming to some point where 
weighing the amount of resources we have, we have limited 
beds, and we feel that perhaps that person has reached a 
plateau of stability/ then we come to the Board to request 
permission to have some management decision made. At this 
point with the limited resources we have here and with the 
structure of the system of the State, we need to do that. 
This past year our unit has been running 110% of occupancy. 
I think that figure tells you what the resources and the 
pressures on us are. You ask me on one individual person. 
Has he reached maximum hospital benefit? Ideally, a person 
who would be judged guilty and mentally ill, I feel, ideally 
should be in a hospital setting or an alternative in which 
there would be very close psychiatric medical supervision for 
the period of time they would be sentenced. Obviously, the 
numbers of people coming through the court system that would 
be adjudicated guilty and mentally ill could result in quite 
a number of beds that would be needed. There are alternatives 
to hospital beds, if you have the right structure, such as 
21 
half-way houses where the monitoring of the medications could 
be done with the right kind of structure and the right kind of 
resources. That is to say at this point if we did not have 
the sentence of the charge then perhaps Mr. Dall could be 
cared for in some very secure residential setting other than 
a hospital setting. But, obviously, it would need to be a 
very well-structured program with security for both the client 
or patient and society. 
Bradshaw: Let me, if I can, direct you away from Mr. Dall for 
a minute and away from the hospital setting, and just ask 
generally in your field, in psychiatry. When we talk about a 
person who has this lifelong history of psychotic thinking, 
when we talk in terms of treatment, what generally do you as 
a psychiatrist envision in terms of treatment for someone with 
that type of problem? 
Washburn: I don't know. Are you supposing this person does 
not have charge or a sentence? 
Bradshaw: Yes, I am assuming that. 
Washburn: If the person did not have a serious charge or 
sentence, there are many individuals I care for who have this 
diagnosis, I care for on an outpatient basis with medication 
checks as I indicated before, every four, six, eight weeks, 
22 
Hunt: So it would be fair then to say that very few of the 
patients that you have seen in here would actually benefit, if 
economics were not a factor, very few would actually benefit 
from a transfer to the State Prison? 
Washburn: To the State Prison. That's an excellent and good 
question and I haven't kept that close of track of it. But as 
a general feeling I believe that of many, many of the people 
that come here, there are some exceptions, but many of the 
people that come here through the system have benefitted from 
the system. On the end of the evaluation process I think that 
there has been a fairly good selection and a there's been a 
good reason to question if they were competent or not. So I 
think we've offered a good service there. In terms of the 
guilty but mentally ill, there is a percentage where I feel 
there needs to be a little tighter, better evaluation. Are 
they truly mentally ill and guilty? That there are some that 
do slip through, that if we broaden it too much then, of 
course, many personality disorders could fit into that kind of 
system. Then we would be overwhelmed and they would not 
benefit and they don't need hospitalization. 
Hunt: Okay. Would it be fair to say that economics is an 
inherent part of the science that you practice in terms of you 
are always confronted as a professional with balancing the 
interest of the person against the resources that are 
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available? Is that a fair statement to make? 
Washburn: We try to. I guess as professionals we try to not 
allow that to be the major reason why we're making a decision 
for hospitalization or certain kinds of treatment, but I think 
in the area of mental illness, it's more, more of a problem 
than in the other illnesses because in many other physical 
illnesses there can be - cures". There can be surgery that is 
short term and you have much better parameters to work with. 
Where as inherently in major mental illness particularly, it's 
something that takes time and that time seems to be the thing 
that creates costs. 
Hunt: Would your conclusion that Kirk has reached his plateau 
be the same even if Kirk was not a criminal commitment here, 
even if for say he was a private individual and we did not 
have the criminal sentence to deal with and we did not have 
the sexual aspects? Would your conclusion that he has reached 
a plateau of treatment and that he is ready to move on to 
another facility be the same? 
Washburn: Without those factors probably we could have moved 
him on sometime ago. 
Hunt: Now there's been some talk of maximum treatment benefit 
or m^ yjTTmTw hospital benefit. You have testified that the 
SO 
treatment itself will have to continue probably for his entire 
life so he has not reached perhaps the pinnacle of his 
treatment. Is that correct? But in terms of maximum hospital 
benefit, would it be your conclusion that at this point he has 
reached a maximum hospital benefit that can be attained given 
resources available at the hospital? 
Washburn: He can still benefit from being in the Hospital. 
But we have to weigh the costs and benefits•• 
Hunt: Okay, and that gets back to our ideal world situation. 
Is it your point, is it your conclusion at this point that we 
have reached the marginal return, a point of diminishing 
returns or declining marginal returns in terms of 
expectations ? 
Washburn: I'm not sure declining, but maybe diminishing. 
Hunt: Okay. And is....I don't think I have any further 
questions. 
Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hunt. 
Brads haw: I have a couple of quick follow-ups, if I might? 
Chair: Could we wait until we're all through? Then I will 
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ADDENDUM D 
Selected Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-241 (Supp. 1992) provides: 
62A-12-241. Release of patient to receive other 
treatment -- Placement in more restrictive environment --
Procedures. 
(1) The director or his designee may release an 
improved patient to less restrictive treatment as may be 
specified by the director or his designee, and agreed to 
in writing by the patient. Whenever the director or his 
designee determines that the conditions justifying 
commitment no longer exist, the patient shall be 
discharged. If the patient has been committed through 
judicial proceedings, a report describing that 
determination shall be sent to the clerk of the court 
where the proceedings were held. 
(2) (a) The director or his designee is 
authorized to issue an order for the immediate 
placement of a patient not previously released 
from an order of commitment into a more 
restrictive environment, if the director or his 
designee has reason to believe that the less 
restrictive environment in which the patient has 
been placed is aggravating the patient's mental 
illness as defined in Subsection 62A-12-234 (10), 
or that the patient has failed to comply with the 
specified treatment plan to which the patient had 
agreed in writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-5 (1990) (enacted 1980) provides: 
77-16-5. Recovery of committed person -- Certification 
to Board of Pardons. 
(1) A person committed to the state hospital after 
sentence who has sufficiently recovered from his mental 
disease or defect shall be certified to the Board of 
Pardons by the clinical director. 
Upon certification, jurisdiction over the person 
shall be transferred to the Board of Pardons and he shall 
be pardoned, paroled, or confined in the state prison for 
the unexpired term of the offense as provided by law with 
credit for time served while confined at the hospital. 
The certification of the clinical director of the 
hospital shall specify with particularity the medical 
facts justifying his certification. 
(2) The provisions of law and the rules and 
regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, regarding 
parole shall apply to persons paroled from the state 
hospital. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-5 (effective March 13, 1990) 
(repealed July 1, 1992) provided: 
77-16a-5. Discharge from psychiatric Security Review 
Board -- Board of Pardons -- Parole -- Review. 
With regard to mentally ill but not mentally retarded 
persons: 
(1) Every six months, the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board shall review the condition of each 
person under its jurisdiction at the state 
hospital, to determine whether custody should be 
transferred to the Board of Pardons. 
(2) (a) If at any time after commitment of a 
person to the hospital under Section 77-16a-4 
whose sentence has not expired, if the 
superintendent of the hospital, or his 
designee, is of the opinion that the person: 
(i) is no longer mentally ill, or (ii) is 
still mentally ill and continues to be a 
danger to himself or others, but can be 
controlled if proper care, medication, and 
treatment are provided, and, in either case, 
(iii) has reached maximum benefit from the 
programs at the hospital, the superintendent 
or his designee shall apply to the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board for a transfer of 
custody to the Board of Pardons. 
(b) The application shall be accompanied by 
a report setting forth the facts supporting 
the opinion of the superintendent or his 
designee, which shall include the clinical 
facts, the diagnosis, the course of treatment 
received at the hospital, the prognosis of the 
remission of the symptoms, the potential for 
recidivism and the danger to himself or 
others, and the recommendations for future 
treatment. If the recommendations included in 
the application involve treatment in the 
community under conditions of parole or 
conditional release, the application must also 
be accompanied by a verified plan of 
treatment. 
(3) (a) When the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board proposes to transfer custody of a 
defendant from the Utah State Hospital to the 
Board of Pardons prior to the expiration of 
sentence, it shall transmit to the Board of 
Pardons a report on the condition of the 
defendant, including all pertinent information 
supplied by the superintendent or his 
designee. 
(b) The Psychiatric Security Review Board 
may make recommendations to the Board of 
Pardons as follows: 
(i) that the defendant serve any or 
all of his unexpired term of sentence at 
the state prison; 
(ii) that the defendant be placed on 
parole; or 
(iii) that the defendant be 
recommitted to the jurisdiction of the 
Psychiatric Security Review Board for 
conditional release in accordance with 
Chapter 38 of this title. 
(c) If the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board recommends to the Board of Pardons that 
a defendant be placed on parole or be placed 
under its jurisdiction for conditional 
release, it shall submit with that 
recommendation a specific program for the 
care, custody, and treatment of the defendant. 
If the defendant is placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board by the Board of Pardons for 
conditional release, failure to complete that 
program shall be grounds for revocation of 
conditional release in accordance with Chapter 
38 of this title. 
(d) The Board of Pardons shall direct that 
the defendant serve any or all of the 
unexpired term of the sentence at the Utah 
State Prison, place the defendant on parole, 
or commit the defendant to the jurisdiction of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board for 
conditional release in accordance with Chapter 
38. 
(e) Pending action of the Board of Pardons, 
the defendant shall remain under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board at the Utah State Hospital. 
(4) (a) If the defendant is placed on parole, 
treatment shall, upon the recommendation of 
the Psychiatric Security Review Board, be made 
a condition of parole. Failure to continue 
treatment or other condition of parole except 
by agreement with the designated mental health 
services provider and the Board of Pardons is 
a basis for initiation of parole violation 
hearings by the Board of Pardons. 
(b) The period of parole may not be for 
fewer than five years or until the expiration 
of the defendant's sentence, whichever occurs 
first, and may not be reduced without 
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a 
current report on the mental health status of 
the offender. 
